

NO CHANGE in Class.
 DECLASSIFIED
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 Date: 21 MAR 1978 By: *O'Dea*

5 April 1952

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 TO: Assistant Director,
 Office of Collection and Dissemination
 FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and Methods Examiner
 SUBJECT: Report on Administrative Services, Area Top
 Secret Control Office and Sub-Station

1. PROBLEM: Review of operating methods of the Area Top Secret Control Office, Administrative Services, for the purpose of insuring compliance with basic Agency regulations and establishing uniform operating methods throughout CIA.

2. INCLUSIVE SURVEY DATES: 1 April 1952
 3 April 1952

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 a. Area Top Secret Control Officer:
 Alternate Top Secret Control Officers: [REDACTED]

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 b. Records Management Sub-Station TSCO:
 Acting Records Management Sub-Station TSCO:
 Assistant Records Management Sub-Station TSCO: [REDACTED]

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 c. Reproduction Sub-Station TSCO:
 Alternate Reproduction Sub-Station TSCO: [REDACTED]

d. Travel Sub-Station: No TS traffic has ever flowed through this sub-station; therefore, the examiner did not review the system.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Obvious Departures from Basic Agency System:

(1) Both of the alternate TSCO's presently designated in the Area control office are officials and are not concerned with the actual operation. The examiner suggested that an alternate be designated and trained who can act in the absence of the Area TSCO. [REDACTED] is being trained and forms for approval will be forwarded shortly.

(2) The Area TSCO lists internal distribution on calendar and does not obtain signatures from internal recipients. The examiner suggested that internal distribution should be entered on the Area log to constitute a permanent record and that signatures should be obtained from any recipient outside the immediate office of the Chief.

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(3) Occasionally, the Area TSCO receives an unnumbered document from another CIA Area and assigns a number. The examiner suggested that she should either return the document for numbering or call the Area for a number rather than using a Services number.

(4) Records Management Sub-Station personnel has shifted but forms for approval have not yet been forwarded. Forms will be forthcoming shortly.

(5) Records Management Sub-Station uses special log forms for TS documents—"Vital Materials Log"-- and for microfilms—"Microfilm Control Log"-- as the standard log form would not adequately fill their needs. By special arrangement these logs are sent to the Area and Central TSC rather than preparing the standard log in addition.

(6) Reproduction Sub-Station lists only incoming documents on its weekly log. Outgoing documents go directly to the mailroom for dispatch after reproduction.

(7) Reproduction has no follow-up system on receipts.

b. Security Hazards:

(1) Records Management has responsibility for sending analysts and photographers to the various offices of CIA to scan TS documents for selection of those to be microfilmed and filming the document in the office. The film is then carried back to Records Management for control and filing. These analysts encounter difficulty in convincing CIA offices that they are authorized to see documents as they do not have any special pass to indicate this authority.

(2) Reproduction has a security problem in that CIA offices occasionally send members of their own staff to stay with a document throughout the reproduction process. Areas should be urged to keep these visitors at the absolute minimum as they place an extra burden on security of the plant and draw attention of plant personnel to the fact that something special is in process.

(3) Certain categories of TS material must unavoidably move outside CIA altogether for special processing. Strict control of the actual documents is exercised but the Area TSCO feels that, if at all possible, outside individuals handling this material should be subjected to CIA investigation and clearance.

c. General Problems

(1) Documents are occasionally received direct from outside agencies.

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(2) Reproduction stated that occasionally other offices fail to accompany documents with receipts which necessitates their preparation by Reproduction.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

The various departures from the basic Agency procedures result, in general, from the unique operations of the Administrative Services divisions and are considered to be justified. The examiner was received in the Area and the Sub-Stations with courtesy, and the personnel were receptive to suggestions for simplification and improvement.

Several security matters in Reproduction which do not tie in directly with this survey were brought to the attention of the examiner. They are listed simply as items of information:

- a. Maintenance men remain on the premises during the entire work-day and the Area TSCO (who is also security officer) feels that the plant is in sufficiently good condition now to have these maintenance men removed and called for only on spot assignments.
- b. A charman from GSA remains on the premises all day. Since his salary is now paid by CIA through GSA, it is suggested that the charman should be a CIA employee subject to clearance.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

- a. The examiner recommends that analysts and photographers from Records Management should be provided with a special card to be exhibited to offices visited. These cards would be held in the Records Management Sub-Station except when in actual use by an analyst.
- b. Inasmuch as the present weekly log submitted by Reproduction lists only incoming documents and does not assist CTSC in follow-up on outgoing documents, the examiner discussed with the Area TSCO a method for incorporating both incoming and outgoing documents in the log. The system devised will not increase the workload and will also serve as a follow-up system which Reproduction does not have at the present time. Delivery tickets showing the date and time documents are dispatched by Reproduction to other Areas are sent daily to the Area TSCO. In future, he will complete his log from these tickets and place the tickets in suspense until the signed document receipt is received from the Area concerned.

Security Information

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c. In order to cut down the number of visitors to Reproduction who accompany documents through processing, it is suggested that clearances could be obtained for the Reproduction TS control officer and the Production Coordinator to handle certain extra-sensitive materials. The Production Coordinator is capable of operating the various machines in the plant and could personally process such material.

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CONCURRENCES:

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CIA Top Secret Control Officer

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